Italy's crisis and the question of democracy by Capussela, Andrea Lorenzo
Italy’s	crisis	and	the	question	of	democracy
The	last	seven	days	in	Italy	have	proven	that	a	week	is	indeed	a	long	time	in	politics:	after	a	political
crisis	emerged	following	Italian	president	Sergio	Mattarella’s	decision	to	veto	the	Five	Star	Movement
and	the	League’s	choice	of	finance	minister,	a	government	led	by	Giuseppe	Conte	was	eventually
sworn	in	on	1	June.	Andrea	Lorenzo	Capussela	argues	that	Mattarella’s	veto	was	wise	because	the
risk	of	Italy	leaving	the	euro	would	have	risen	more	than	negligibly,	but	while	the	new	government	might
restore	some	stability,	it	is	unlikely	to	tackle	the	real	roots	of	the	crisis,	namely	low	growth,	rising
inequality,	and	political	distrust.
Luigi	Di	Maio,	Sergio	Mattarella	and	Giuseppe	Conte	on	1	June	2018,	Credit:	Presidenza	della	Repubblica	(Public	Domain)
The	crisis	exploded	on	the	highest	of	Rome’s	hills,	between	the	evening	of	Sunday	28	May	and	the	following
afternoon.	The	trigger	was	a	sequence	of	three	discrete	choices.	First,	the	president	of	the	republic	refused	to
appoint	as	finance	minister	the	person	chosen	by	the	two	political	parties	that	prepared	to	take	office,	the	League	and
the	Five	Star	Movement	(M5S).	Second,	the	latter	reacted	by	refusing	to	form	a	government.	Third,	the	president
granted	to	a	technocrat	the	mandate	to	form	a	non-partisan,	transition	government	and	prepare	for	early	elections,	no
later	than	early	2019.
That	day	the	interest-rate	spread	between	Italian	and	German	bonds	recorded	its	largest	single-day	rise	since	the
euro	was	created.	The	ripples	quickly	traversed	Europe	and	crossed	the	Atlantic.
The	critiques
Many	commentators	have	argued	that	the	president’s	choices	wounded	Italy’s	democracy	and	were	damaging	or
counterproductive	(e.g.,	Jan	Zielonka,	most	interestingly,	and,	more	radically,	Yanis	Varoufakis;	and,	on	Twitter,	in
alphabetic	order,	Paul	Krugman,	Branko	Milanovic,	Ann	Pettifor,	Helen	Thompson).	I	disagree	with	the	first	argument
and	partly	also	with	the	second.
Before	I	turn	to	the	substance,	I	would	like	to	remove	one	set	of	issues	from	the	table.	The	commentators	I	chose	to
cite,	among	many	possible	ones,	are	all	far	removed	from	the	political	allies	of	the	League,	who	cried	‘coup	d’état!’
(Marine	Le	Pen).	Their	democratic	credentials	are	impeccable,	to	my	eyes,	and	their	motives	unimpeachable.
Besides	the	democratic	principle	they	invoked	also	arguments	I	share,	moreover,	well	outlined	in	Robert	Hancké’s
milder	post	on	this	blog,	such	as	opposition	to	pro-cyclical	fiscal	austerity	(see	also	here)	and	free-market	orthodoxy,
or	the	need	to	rethink	Western	capitalism	and	the	approach	to	European	integration.	And	I	readily	grant	that	the	veto
did	objectively	look	very	bad.	But	it	was	not.
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Their	critiques,	often	moved	jointly,	can	be	grouped	into	three	categories.	One	claims	that	the	veto	was	illegitimate,
because	it	breached	the	democratic	principle	(it	denied	the	voters’	choices;	it	interfered	with	the	political	agenda	of	a
parliamentary	majority;	it	imposed	on	voters	and	their	elected	representatives	the	president’s	and	the	establishment’s
agenda	–	or,	in	other	variants,	the	markets’,	the	EU’s,	or	even	Germany’s).	Another	claims	that	the	veto	was	unwise,
because	it	was	certain	to	increase	political	distrust,	strengthen	anti-euro,	anti-EU,	or	anti-establishment	sentiment,
and	boost	the	League’s	and	the	Five	Star	Movement’s	support.	A	third	claims	that	the	appointment	of	a	technocrat	as
prime	minister	designate	was	equally	unwise,	for	the	same	reasons.	I	shall	deal	with	each	in	turn,	having	laid	down
the	premises	of	my	objections.
The	premises
Italy’s	is	a	parliamentary	democracy.	Elections	form	parliaments,	which	form	governments,	which	are	typically
coalition	ones.	The	presidency	of	the	republic	was	shaped	as	a	neutral	non-executive	authority.	Elected	by
parliament	under	rules	that	favour	wide	consensus,	and	given	a	term	(7)	two	years	longer	than	parliament’s	(5),	the
head	of	state	was	granted	powers	–	nominating	the	prime	minister	and	dissolving	parliament	–	that	can	be	decisive
absent	a	cohesive	parliamentary	majority,	as	in	the	present	case.
A	third	power,	less	significant	but	relevant	also	when	a	solid	majority	exists,	is	the	veto	on	the	ministers	chosen	by
the	prime	minister	designate	(the	veto	comes	before	the	cabinet	asks	parliament’s	confidence).	This	power	is	written
into	the	constitution,	has	no	explicit	limits,	and	its	exercise	need	not	be	motivated.
The	veto	is	one	of	several	means	by	which	Italy’s	constitution	seeks	to	check	the	power	of	parliamentary	majorities.
This	approach	–	though	not	specifically	this	power	–	has	often	been	criticised,	also	with	reasonable	arguments	(it
complicates	and	delays	decision-making).	Its	defenders	invoke	the	safety	argument,	which	survived	its	main
contingent	historical	rationale	(the	acute	political-ideological	polarisation	of	the	immediate	post-war	years,	which
persisted	until	the	1980s).	Republican	political	theory	can	provide	other	justifications.
Nobody	doubts	that	the	veto	has	implicit	limits,	but	people	disagree	on	what	and	how	stringent	they	are.	Two
plausible	ones	that	would	be	relevant	here	are	no	arbitrariness	(the	veto	must	have	a	solid	factual	basis)	and	political
neutrality	(the	veto	cannot	be	used	to	change	the	prospective	government’s	programme	or	impose	the	president’s
political	agenda	on	it).
The	veto	was	used	a	handful	of	times.	The	latest	instance	was	in	2014,	when	the	predecessor	of	the	current
president	vetoed	a	minister	designated	by	Matteo	Renzi.	On	each	occasion	the	coalition	parties	and	their	prime
minister	selected	another	minister.
By	reason	of	all	this,	on	the	formation	of	a	new	government	talks	on	the	list	of	ministers	are	invariably	held	between
the	prime	minister	and	the	president.	They	are	confidential,	naturally,	but	newspapers	regularly	write	about	them,
frequently	citing	both	party	and	presidency	sources.	Sometimes	disagreements	arise,	they	are	often	leaked,	analysts
and	politicians	take	sides,	a	compromise	is	found,	and	the	press	usually	describes	it	as	such,	with	neither	the
president	nor	the	prime	minister	denying	it.	So,	the	veto	power	has	effectively	morphed	into	moral	suasion	–	which
certainly	was	the	aim	of	this	rule	–	and	is	a	physiological	trait	of	Italian	politics.	Indeed,	when	a	government	is	to	be
formed	newspapers	usually	write	articles	on	how	easy	it	will	be	to	agree	the	list	of	ministers,	and	what	red	lines	the
president	will	set.	The	public	is	informed	and	can	judge.
The	events
On	Sunday	28	May,	the	president	exercised	the	veto,	and,	for	the	first	time	since	1948,	when	the	constitution	was
adopted,	the	coalition	refused	to	form	a	government.	It	was	a	legitimate	choice,	of	course,	but	it	was	their	choice.
This	is	enough	to	dismiss	critiques	that	conflate	the	two	steps,	to	argue	that	the	president	breached	the	democratic
principle	because	he	‘prevented’	the	coalition	from	forming	a	government.	This	is	not	what	happened.
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On	the	contrary,	the	events	suggest	that	the	coalition	had	engaged	in	a	game	of	chicken	with	the	president.	Their
divergence	on	the	finance	minister	designate	–	Paolo	Savona	–	began	well	before	28	May,	and	the	press	reported
that	both	sides	had	progressively	hardened	their	positions.	In	particular,	the	League	was	reported	to	have	told	the
president	that	without	Savona	there	would	be	no	government.	This	would	have	amounted	to	an	attempt	to	coerce	the
president	to	effectively	waive	the	veto,	which	would	have	weakened	the	presidency’s	hand	in	subsequent	occasions
and	changed	the	established	practice.	But	reliable	information	on	all	this	is	limited	and	the	president	did	not	cite	this
as	a	reason	for	the	veto.	So	I	leave	this	aspect	aside,	including	because	the	coalition’s	would	have	been	a	legitimate,
if	irresponsible,	strategy.
The	president	cited	two	reasons	for	the	veto,	both	predicated	on	two	assumptions.	The	first	was	the	risk	that
Savona’s	appointment	–	by	reason	of	opinions	he	had	expressed,	papers	he	had	written,	plans	he	had	prefigured,	as
well	as	by	reason	of	the	symbolic	and	signalling	value	of	his	appointment,	after	a	long	stand-off	due	precisely	to
these	reasons	–	would	trigger	a	sequence	leading	(potentially	unstoppably,	after	a	tipping	point)	to	Italy	exiting	the
euro.
The	second	assumption	is	that,	unlike	most	other	policy	changes,	euro	exit	cannot	be	undone:	its	consequences,
good	or	bad,	are	de	facto	irremediable.	On	this	double	basis,	the	first	of	the	president’s	arguments	was	that	there
had	been	neither	popular	endorsement	nor	proper	public	debate	on	the	choice	of	leaving	the	euro,	as	neither	party
had	run	on	such	a	proposal	(which	indeed	was	not	part	of	the	coalition	‘contract’	they	agreed	and	published).	The
other	argument	was	protecting	citizens’	savings.	The	coalition’s	argument	was	that	the	veto	was	illegitimate	and
Savona	crucial	for	implementing	its	programme.
The	veto:	legitimacy
The	assumptions	supporting	the	president’s	arguments	seem	plausible	enough:	Savona’s	appointment	could	raise
the	chances	of	an	exit	to	more	than	a	negligible	degree,	and	exit	would	be	de	facto	irremediable.	So	his	first
argument	is	most	probably	valid	(not	arbitrary;	neutral).
One	might	retort	that	as	the	only	way	to	exit	the	euro	without	catastrophic	damage	is	arguably	through	a	surprise
move,	this	reasoning	would	imply	that	Italy	can	never	exit.	I	would	accept	this	implication,	and	note	that	it	is
consistent	with	Dani	Rodrik’s	convincing	‘trilemma’	argument	(e.g.	here).	But	I	would	deny	that	it	amounts	to
confutation	by	reductio	ad	absurdum.	First,	the	same	is	true	of	going	to	war	counting	on	the	surprise	effect.	Second,
it	would	imply	that	before	acting	one	must	test	popular	sentiment	in	other	ways.	Third,	in	the	present	case	the
democracy	argument	works	against	the	critics,	for	polls	tell	us	that	a	clear	majority	of	Italians	still	support	the	euro.
The	second	argument	–	to	the	extent	it	can	be	seen	as	separate	from	the	first	–	seems	less	valid,	as	reasonable
people	may	disagree	on	how	best	to	protect	savings.	But	one	valid	argument	is	enough.
The	coalition’s	argument	seems	weak,	conversely,	and	is	certainly	weaker	than	the	president’s.	Savona	can	hardly
have	been	crucial	for	implementing	the	coalition’s	programme,	because	he	is	neither	a	parliamentarian	nor	a	member
or	adviser	of	their	parties,	he	was	absent	from	the	electoral	campaign,	and,	by	the	Five	Star	Movement	and	the
League’s	own	admission,	his	name	was	chosen	only	after	they	wrote	up	the	coalition	programme.	So,	until	fairly
recently	they	were	ready	to	go	ahead	without	him.	Admittedly,	they	said	that	Savona	helped	revise	the	programme
on	the	coalition’s	approach	to	Eurozone	and	EU	policy.	Admittedly,	finance	is	the	most	important	ministry,	arguably,
as	it	is	the	result	of	the	merger	(in	the	1990s)	of	the	budget,	finance,	and	treasury	ministries.	Even	so,	the	argument
of	irreplaceability	is	theoretically	dubious	and	factually	unproven.
It	began	to	crumble	when,	already	on	Tuesday	29	May,	the	League	and	the	Five	Star	Movement	resumed	talks	on
forming	a	government	based	on	the	same	programme	but	without	that	Savona	as	finance	minister.	The	government
was	sworn	in	on	Friday	1	June,	and	Savona	is	a	second-tier	minister,	without	a	ministry	below	him,	in	charge	of	EU
affairs.	Whatever	the	reasons	for	this	decision	–	which	may	well	include	concern	for	market	tensions,	or	the	second
game	of	chicken	I	shall	mention	below	–	it	proved	that	irreplaceability	was	not	a	serious	argument	but	mere	rhetoric.
LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog: Italy’s crisis and the question of democracy Page 3 of 5
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-06-04
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2018/06/04/italys-crisis-and-the-question-of-democracy/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/
So,	the	president	neither	prevented	the	formation	of	a	government	(it	was	the	coalition’s	decision)	nor	wounded
democracy	(the	veto	was	a	defensible	use	of	an	ordinary	power).	Nor	did	this	case	prove	that	the	veto	is	a	bad
instrument	per	se,	because	it	was	exercised	‘against’	a	coalition	that,	albeit	fully	legitimate,	had	been	made	between
two	direct	competitors,	which	had	run	against	each	other,	and	was	led	by	an	unelected	technocrat,	whom	the
coalition	chose	against	the	president’s	perplexities,	and	would	have	had	another	technocrat	as	finance	minister.	So,
not	even	in	a	broader	sense	can	it	be	plausibly	said	that	the	president’s	action	denied	the	‘voters’	will’.
The	veto:	wisdom
Turning	to	the	wisdom	of	the	veto,	on	one	pan	of	the	balance	lay	the	risk	of	exit	and	the	weakening	of	the	veto,	on
the	other	were	the	risks	highlighted	by	the	critics	(increasing	political	distrust	and	anti-euro	and	anti-establishment
sentiment,	strengthening	the	League	and	the	Five	Star	Movement).	Not	an	easy	choice,	naturally.	Including,
paradoxically,	because	part	of	the	second	set	of	arguments	sat	uneasily	with	the	neutrality	principle:	could	the
president	accept	increasing	the	risk	of	exit	to	avoid	a	possible	surge	in	support	for	the	League	and	the	Five	Star
Movement?	Hardly,	in	pure	principle.	And	yet	some	critics	attacked	both	the	legitimacy	of	the	veto	and	its	wisdom,
arguing	at	once	for	and	against	democratic	neutrality.
I	think	the	veto	was	wise,	because	the	risk	of	exit	would	have	risen	more	than	negligibly.	Exit	would	probably	have
remained	an	unlikely	event,	but	as	it	is	potentially	destructive	–	for	both	Italy	the	continent,	as	the	country’s	exit	would
endanger	the	survival	of	the	Eurozone	and	the	EU	itself	–	the	risk	dwarfs	the	side	effects	(which	critics	might
overestimate,	incidentally,	precisely	because	they	view	the	veto	as	illegitimate:	but	if	the	veto	was	legitimate	and
consistent	with	past	practice,	as	I	argued,	its	rationale	can	be	explained	to	Italy’s	citizens,	limiting	those	effects).
Of	course,	I	say	this	because	I	see	the	euro	as	a	step	for	greater	political	integration	–	which	I	view	as	both	vital	in
itself	and	the	superior	response	to	Rodrik’s	trilemma	–	and	I	am	ready	to	accept	further	sacrifices	to	keep	that
perspective	alive,	including	those	imposed	by	mistaken	European	policies.	I	do	not	(yet)	think	that	the	costs	of	the
flawed	architecture	of	both	the	Eurozone	and	the	EU	justify	abandoning	either.	I	may	well	be	wrong,	naturally,	but
clearly	this	trade-off	must	be	discussed	publicly	and	comprehensively	–	in	some	way	that	is	compatible	with	the
constraint	I	mentioned	earlier,	for	which	some	institutional	ingenuity	is	probably	required	–	before	any	step	is	taken
than	could	precipitate	exit.
But	the	wisdom	of	the	veto	was	seriously	damaged	eighteen	hours	later,	by	the	appointment	of	a	technocrat	of	the
president’s	own	choosing	–	Carlo	Cottarelli,	a	widely	respected	figure	–	as	prime	minister	designate.
An	o’er-hasty	appointment
There	was	nothing	wrong	per	se	in	that	appointment.	If	parliament	cannot	form	a	government,	fresh	elections	are
necessary;	to	run	the	state	until	the	vote	a	government	is	needed;	better	a	politically	neutral	one.	The	problem	lies	in
the	speed	of	the	appointment,	in	the	president’s	suggestion	that	Cottarelli’s	cabinet	should	have	done	the	2019
budget,	and	in	a	long	history	of	the	political	establishment	ducking	tough	political	choices	by	having	technocrats
make	them	(in	1993–4,	1995–6,	and	2011–13).
Despite	their	occasional	rhetoric,	which	was	but	a	bow	to	the	democratic	principle,	this	strategy	was	always
supported	by	large	political	majorities,	often	those	that	counted	on	winning	the	elections	once	the	technocrats	had
left.	They	were	happy	to	have	the	latter	advance	the	policies	they	believed	were	necessary	but	lacked	the	credibility,
the	internal	cohesion,	the	ideas,	or	even	the	guts	to	do	themselves	(1993–4:	a	form	of	incomes	policy	favouring	wage
restraint,	which	proved	tough	on	workers;	1995–6,	the	first	big	tough	pension	reform;	2011–13	other	pension	and
labour-market	reforms,	to	quote	but	the	most	obvious	examples).	A	strategy	which	largely	explains	why	such
reforms,	lacking	a	proper	public	debate	to	support	them,	were	sometimes	highly	questionable,	often	resented,	and
frequently	ineffective.	And	a	strategy	which	epitomises	both	the	weakness	of	the	country’s	political	establishment	and
the	deeper	reasons	for	this	crisis,	of	which	the	veto	was	just	the	accidental	trigger.
Cottarelli’s	appointment	carried	all	this	burden	on	its	shoulders.	Coming	a	few	hours	after	the	veto,	and	thus
foreclosing	any	chance	of	forming	an	alternative	political	coalition,	it	was	as	suspicious	as	Gertrude’s	‘untimely’
second	marriage.	It	objectively	invited	the	conclusion	that	the	spendthrift	barbarians	had	been	kicked	out	to	call	in	the
non-disputable	experts	of	fiscal	discipline	and	structural	reform,	again.	This	was	less	than	half	true,	as	I	said,	but
enough	so	to	be	disastrous,	as	the	markets	realised	in	the	space	of	an	hour	or	two.
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A	fairly	roundabout	way	of	forming	another	underwhelming	cabinet
What	followed	were	hurried	attempts	to	contain	the	damage,	not	always	lucid	and	sometimes	self-interested.	Maybe
the	League	and	the	Five	Star	Movement	were	wrong-footed	by	the	president’s	and	the	markets’	reaction,	maybe	the
president	had,	by	Cottarelli’s	appointment,	begun	his	own	game	of	chicken	against	the	coalition,	leveraging	precisely
on	the	markets’	reaction	to	push	them	against	the	wall.	But	all	this,	by	now,	is	of	interest	chiefly	to	the	future
biographers	of	the	protagonists.
The	outcome	is	a	semi-technocratic	coalition	cabinet,	with	limited	experience	and	modest	credibility,	both	internally
and	externally,	which	is	supported	by	political	competitors	that	visibly	do	not	trust	each	other.	In	this,	it	does	not
radically	differ	from	several	previous	governments	(except,	that	is,	in	its	programme,	part	of	which	is	gravely
irresponsible,	radically	unjust,	or	both:	fiscal	and	migration	policy,	chiefly).	It	might	restore	a	degree	of	stability,
therefore,	compared	at	least	to	the	previous	few	days.	Italy	needs	it,	to	address	the	real	roots	of	the	crisis,	namely
low	growth,	rising	inequality,	and	political	distrust.
As	I	argue	in	a	recent	book	on	the	country’s	decline,	however,	these	phenomena	have	very	deep	causes,	the
remedying	of	which	will	require	a	long,	choral	effort	of	Italian	society.	But	the	country	seems	now	squeezed	between
two	political	alternatives,	the	establishment	and	its	‘populist’	challengers,	neither	of	which	seem	fully	aware	of	those
problems,	let	alone	able	or	even	willing	to	tackle	them	(or	to	contribute	constructively	to	equally	necessary	Eurozone
and	EU	reform).	So,	Italy	needs	also	time,	to	discuss	what	kind	of	society	it	wants	to	become	and	organise	its	moral
and	intellectual	energies	into	a	better	set	of	political	alternatives.
These	observations	invite	one	last	remark	on	those	confident	critiques,	rapidly	relayed	across	the	web.	Italy	is	a
country	in	fairly	ill	health,	whose	stability	hangs	on	the	delicate	balance	of	powerful	contrary	tensions.	It	can	be
compared	to	a	china	shop	with	too	few	customers,	whose	bankruptcy	could	ruin	the	whole	neighbourhood.	The
elephants	that	entered	it	last	Monday	might,	upon	reflection,	have	spoken	more	advisedly.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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